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ABSTRACT 
 
Iran’s Use of Ancient Art and Architecture to Construct a Modern National Identity 
 
Rebecca Matlock 
Department of International Studies 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Nancy Klein 
Department of Architecture 
Texas A&M University 
 
In the sixth century BCE, the Achaemenid Persian Empire stretched from the Nile River 
to the Indus Valley, incorporating the art of conquered civilizations into a collective Persian 
culture. In twentieth century Iran, the Pahlavi Shahs utilized this Achaemenid past in an attempt 
to fabricate a national narrative. However, it is unclear how the role of antiquity in Iran has 
changed since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Shah. My research takes an 
interdisciplinary approach, employing a modern perspective of nationalist theory in order to 
better understand the art of antiquity and its use in Iran since the beginning of Reza Shah 
Pahlavi’s reign in 1925. Through looking at textbooks, the architecture of government buildings, 
museum exhibitions and lectures, archaeological research and conservation projects, and 
festivals, this project seeks to add to the understanding of the government’s role in utilizing 
antiquity to invent a national identity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, Iran seems elusive. As James A. Bill said in his 1978 article in Foreign Affairs, 
“America knows astonishingly little about Iran.”1 Years after the Islamic Revolution, in his 2002 
State of the Union address, U.S. President George W. Bush equated Iran with the “Axis of Evil.” 
Since then, in the fall of 2015, America opened up ties with Iran again, cutting back on sanctions 
as a part of the Iran Nuclear Deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This has allowed 
scholars and archaeologists to return to Iran in order to better understand this ancient land of 
empire; this also allows for the heritage of Iran to be displayed on a larger world stage. However, 
in light of recent events, the future of the U.S.-Iranian relationship is at risk. 
 My paper will be organized in the following way: First, I will discuss Achaemenid Persia 
under Cyrus the Great and Darius in order to better understand the art forms used during this 
time period and how the kings utilized the art of conquered civilizations in order to convince the 
people within the empire that they were now all a part of the same group. Then, I will consider 
the twentieth century uses of antiquity under Reza Shah Pahlavi and his son, Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi. This will include heritage preservation, neo-Achaemenid architecture, and the 
1971 celebration of 2500 years of continuous Persian kingship. Finally, I will explore how 
antiquity has been utilized by the current Iranian regime since the 1979 Revolution. What part, if 
any, does Achaemenid history and art still play in Iranian national identity? 
 Throughout this paper, I will discuss these time periods, rulers, and art forms through an 
approach based in nationalist theory. This project will explore how national identity is invented 
through the government’s creation of a collective memory, including an origin story and a myth 
                                                
1 James A. Bill. “Iran and the Crisis of '78.” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 2 (1978): 323. 
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of linear destiny. Nationalism offers a different lens and dimension to the understanding of art 
history and its context, illustrating how art is harnessed for political purposes. 
Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Etienne Balibar all approach nationalism from a 
modern perspective and ask how the nation is formed. They understand that the nation is not a 
natural entity that has always been there, but rather is a product of modernity. These authors also 
discuss how the nation is often fabricated by the government. 
Ernest Gellner, a British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist, argues for the 
nationalist principle, in which the nation and the state must be congruent. Thus, the state, which 
is the political entity of the nation, utilizes nationalist rhetoric in order to legitimize its existence. 
Nationalism also uses as raw material the cultural and historical inheritances from the pre-
nationalist world; this adds to our understanding of why and how antiquity is a popular tool for 
legitimizing current regimes. 2 
Eric Hobsbawm, a British Marxist historian, argues that traditions linking us to an 
immemorial past were often actually invented in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries by 
governments. Hobsbawm adds that the state must now formulate new forms of civic loyalty, 
because dynastic legitimacy, divine ordination, and historic right and continuity of rule have lost 
power as guarantors of loyalty.3 These outdated tools were all utilized by the Shahs, but were 
ultimately unsuccessful in creating an Iranian national identity. 
 Etienne Balibar, a French theorist and author, describes the presentation of the nation’s 
formation as twofold: a project and a destiny. This convinces the people that the nation has 
always been there and that it continues to develop toward a greater purpose. Balibar, as well as 
                                                
2 Ernest Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 47. 
3 Eric Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 84. 
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Benedict Anderson, argues that all communities are imaginary; 4 the community is imagined 
through a collective narrative, a common name, and an immemorial past. Public schools are an 
effective way, he argues, to create the collective narrative.5 
In “Images of the Nation: Cinema, art and national identity,” Anthony D. Smith, a British 
historical sociologist, acknowledges the ideas of these modernist authors while discussing the 
historicist vision of the nation. However, he identifies a problem with their perspective: failing to 
analyze the content and the tone of the nationalist message to convince the masses “that this was 
indeed their nation, and that they should identify with it and defend it.”6 Thus, Smith researches 
mass media, such as epic cinema and history painting, and how it promotes the nationalist 
ideology. He identifies certain criteria that set the tone of the nationalist message: historical 
reconstruction, pictorial tableaux, period accessories, and ethnoscape. Although the Shahs used 
these criteria in some cases, their nationalist agenda failed to appeal to the masses, and the 
subsequent backlash led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 2006. 
5 Etienne Balibar. “The Nation Form: History and Ideology.” In Balibar, Étienne, and Immanuel 
Maurice Wallerstein. Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. (London; New York: Verso, 
1991), 96. 
6 Anthony D. Smith. “Images of the Nation: Cinema, art and national identity.” In Hjort, Mette, 
and Scott MacKenzie. Cinema and Nation. (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 43. 
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CHAPTER I 
ACHAEMENID PERSIA 
 
Persia in the sixth century BCE was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual empire that would grow 
to stretch from the Nile River to the Indus Valley. The Achaemenid Persian kings conquered 
twenty-eight different groups of people, including the Elamites, Judaeans, Babylonians, and 
Egyptians. Thus, they utilized images, languages, and symbols to acknowledge the diversity of 
this vast empire and their right to rule over it. 
Cyrus the Great 
 Cyrus II ‘the Great’ reigned from 559 to 529 BCE. Around 559 BCE, Cyrus became king 
of Anshan, claiming descent from the royal house of Persia. He is considered the founder of the 
Persian, and in particular the Achaemenid, Empire. During his rule, Cyrus built Pasargadae, the 
first Achaemenid Persian capital; this is also the location of his monumental tomb. In 549, he 
captured the Medean capital of Ecbatana and proceeded to conquer Lydia, Phoenicia, Judaea, 
and finally Babylon in 539. Through these conquests, “Cyrus’s empire took on much of the 
culture of previous Elamite, Assyrian, and Babylonian empires, notably in its written script and 
monumental iconography.”7 
Cyrus Cylinder 
As was written on a cylinder seal, this conqueror of Babylon promised to maintain 
religious freedoms within the new empire (Fig. 1). Further, Cyrus restored the Temple of 
Marduk, criticizing the previous ruler, King Nabonidus of Babylon, for not maintaining religious 
                                                
7 Michael Axworthy. A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind. (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 
12. 
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sites well. The Cyrus Cylinder implies that the Babylonian god Marduk searched for a better 
king and found Cyrus to be the messiah. The Cylinder proclaims this in the Babylonian script:  
I am Cyrus, king of the universe, the great king, the powerful king, king of Babylon, king 
of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four quarters of the world, son of Cambyses, the great 
king, king of the city of Anshan, grandson of Cyrus, the great king, king of the city of 
Anshan, descendant of Teispes, the great king, king of Anshan, the perpetual seed of 
kingship, whose reign Bel and Nabu love, and with whose kingship, to their joy, they 
concern themselves.8  
This rhetoric legitimized his conquest of Babylon by connecting to the city’s gods, Bel and 
Nabu, invoking his divine right to rule. He also portrayed his royal lineage and continuity of rule. 
“The perpetual seed of kingship” derived from Cyrus’s ancestors listed here invokes a sense of 
destiny, adding to the feeling of national identity, because Etienne Balibar argues that a nation 
must construct a history in such a way that the people believe it was predetermined.9 
In 529 BCE, the Persian kingship did perpetuate when Cyrus was succeeded by his son 
Cambyses, who extended the empire through the conquest of Egypt. This led Persian art to 
incorporate Egyptian motifs, such as at Persepolis and the nearby tombs of Naqsh-i-Rustam. 
Following a short reign and a revolt in c. 522 BCE, Cambyses was succeeded by Darius I.  
Bisitun 
The Bisitun rock relief is a symbol of post-revolt propaganda that seeks to assert the 
power of Darius I after he crushed a Magi revolt in c. 522 BCE and assumed the kingship.10 
Magi were priests of the Zoroastrian religion. Guamata, one of the Magi, had ordered a three-
year remission of taxes and destroyed the temples of those sects of which he did not approve. 
Against this revolt, King Darius claimed to have fought nineteen battles in the first year of his 
                                                
8 The British Museum. “The Cyrus Cylinder.” 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectI
d=327188&partId=1. 
9 Balibar, “The Nation Form,” 86. 
10 Also spelled Bisotun, Bisutun, Behistun, and Bagastana. 
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reign. The circumstances of this ancient revolt have even resonated with modern historians of the 
1979 Iranian Revolution. 
An Iranian Revolution, led by a charismatic cleric, seizing power from an oppressive 
monarch, asserting religious orthodoxy, attacking false believers, and drawing support 
from economic grievances – how modern that sounds.11 
The Bisitun carving depicts Darius’s reaction to the revolt (Fig. 2). The image displays 
rows of captives – each dressed in their own cultural attire, portraying that the revolt affected the 
entire empire. The Magi Guamata lies in submission under Darius’s feet. In order to legitimize 
his claim to the throne, Darius commanded that this image be created on a high cliff along the 
caravan road that connected the Achaemenid capitals of Ecbatana and Babylon so that travelers 
below could be a witness to his triumph as they crossed his empire. This inscription acted as a 
political billboard, illustrating his power over this multicultural empire. 
In connection with many other works by the Achaemenid Persian kings, the written 
inscription on the relief is in three different languages: Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian. If 
the picture did not speak a thousand words, the writing next to it did. Linguistic identity is an 
essential aspect of nationalism; Etienne Balibar wrote that both linguistic identity and racial 
identity must be utilized in order to produce a fictive ethnicity, and thus, a national identity.12 
Centuries before Balibar’s writing, Darius I utilized this idea to convince the people of his 
empire that they belonged, incorporating a variety of languages in order to represent the people 
whom he conquered.  
On this Bisitun inscription, Darius declares, “This is what I have done, by the grace of 
Ahura Mazda have I always acted.”13 Ahura Mazda is the creator and the god of blessing in the 
                                                
11 Axworthy, A History of Iran, 17. 
12 Balibar, “The Nation Form,” 96. 
13 Axworthy, A History of Iran, 19. 
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Zoroastrian religion.14 The relief depicts the winged disk of Ahura Mazda, while the king mirrors 
his gesture and dress. Their right hands are raised; the god’s left hand grasps “the ring, which 
bestows sovereignty on monarchs.”15 The king’s left hand holds a bow to illustrate that he is the 
protector, carrying out the god’s will in his empire. As many other leaders throughout time and 
cultures have done, Darius legitimizes his rule through a religious authority, here through his 
mirroring of Ahura Mazda. Darius was not the heir to the throne, as he was “descended from a 
junior branch of the Achaemenid royal family, and even in that line he was not preeminent,” so it 
was essential that he legitimize his reign through other means.16 Although this was an effective 
tool for the Achaemenid Persians, Eric Hobsbawm tells us that divine ordination can no longer 
guarantee civic loyalty at the time of the Shahs in the twentieth century. 
Persepolis 
The capital cities of the Achaemenid rulers, such as Persepolis and Susa, stood for the 
entire empire, and thus, had to represent the entire empire; Persian kings employed language and 
art in order to convey this. The imagery at the palace of Persepolis further served to legitimize 
the reign of King Darius I and his successors. Within this palace, it can be seen that Darius did 
not reject or disdain earlier Elamite culture, but engaged Elamite cultural legacies “as 
instruments of historical memory.”17 Further, with his re-conquest of Egypt in 518 BCE, 
architecture was included within Persepolis that evoked the Egyptian culture. With every new 
                                                
14 Fritz Graf. ‘Ahura Mazdā’. In Brill’s New Pauly, edited by Hubert Cancik, Helmuth 
Schneider, Christine F. Salazar, Manfred Landfester, and Francis G. Gentry. New Pauly Online. 
15 George G. Cameron. “Darius Carved History on Ageless Rock.” The National Geographic 
Magazine XCVIII, no. 6 (1950): 826. 
16 Axworthy, A History of Iran, 18. 
17 Margaret Cool Root. “Achaemenid Imperial Architecture: Performative Porticoes of 
Persepolis.” In Persian Kingship and Architecture: Strategies of Power in Iran from the 
Achaemenids to the Pahlavis, edited by Sussan Babaie and Talinn Grigor. (I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 
2015), 3. 
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people and land added into the Persian fold, the imagery of those people was often added to the 
sculptural program of the capital cities. Darius even brought masons from Egypt and carvers 
from Assyria to construct his palace.18 
Gate of All Nations 
Built under King Xerxes, who was the successor of Darius, the Gate of All Nations is the 
gate through which visitors, including tribute bearers and foreign ambassadors, would have 
entered the palatial complex in order to pay homage to the Persian king (Fig. 3). As these visitors 
entered, they would have seen the trilingual inscription on the wall in Babylonian, Elamite, and 
Old Persian. This inscription proclaims Xerxes’ kingship and divine right to rule.  
The gate is flanked by two monumental bull guardians that harken back to the lamassu 
figures of the Assyrian culture, which was one of the civilizations incorporated into the Persian 
Empire. This bull motif can also be seen in other locations throughout the complex.  
Apadana 
The Apadana, or Audience Hall, is where the king would sit on his throne to receive 
tribute from his subjects. The staircase leading to the Apadana displays lines of tribute bearers 
bringing goods from all across the empire, reflecting the actual people who would have ascended 
the staircase in order to offer tribute to the king on his throne within the Audience Hall (Fig. 4, 
5). Each group of tribute bearers can be recognized as a member of a certain ethnic group within 
the empire because of their clothing, their hair, and the goods that they bring. The Treasury 
                                                
18 Sava Popovitch. “The Iranian Element in Persian Art.” The Burlington Magazine for 
Connoisseurs 57, no. 331 (1930): 193. 
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Relief depicts the end of the tribute procession, where the gifts are presented to the Persian king 
seated on his throne (Fig. 6).19  
Scholars believe that the imagery on the Apadana staircase represents a celebration of the 
Iranian New Year, or Nowruz, with the tribute brought for this celebration. Within the Gregorian 
calendar, Nowruz, meaning ‘new day,’ occurs on March 20 or 21, the spring equinox. This is 
when the sun crosses the celestial equator, marking the beginning of the growing season. The 
lion and bull, displayed prominently on the Apadana staircase, represent Nowruz, because in the 
Near East, the lion has been associated with solar energy, while the bull has been associated with 
the moon; the lion attacking the bull is a symbol for the sun’s overtaking of the moon and the 
beginning of spring. Among the tribute bearers, the Elamites bring a lioness and her cubs, while 
the Babylonians offer a bull to be sacrificed for the celebration. In addition to the staircase 
images, there are columns with lion and bull protomes throughout the complex.  
Buried within the foundations of the Apadana, archaeologists discovered gold and silver 
tablets. The trilingual text on these tablets declares, “This is the kingdom which I [Darius] hold, 
from the Scythians, who are beyond Sogdiana, thence unto Kush; from Sind thence unto 
Sardis.”20 This idea of representing a vast, multicultural territory is at the foundation of both the 
palace and the empire. 
The imagery of Persepolis creates “a mystique of magnificent kingship that might not 
have come about but for the initial doubts over [Darius’s] accession.”21 Darius and his successors 
utilize art in order to legitimize their kingship by invoking their divine right and by 
acknowledging the diverse cultures within their jurisdiction. 
                                                
19 The name “Treasury Relief” comes from its discovery in the Treasury, but archaeologists have 
discovered that this relief was originally displayed within the Apadana. 
20 Axworthy, A History of Iran, 19. 
21 Ibid, 20. 
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Tombs at Naqsh-i-Rustam 
 Cut into the cliffs of Naqsh-i-Rustam near the site of Persepolis are the tombs of Darius I 
and his successors (Fig. 7). The tomb façade has columns with campaniform bases and bull 
protome capitals, as seen within the Apadana. The upper reliefs of these tomb façades share 
imagery with the sculptural program of Persepolis, but here it is in a funerary context. As in the 
Bisitun Inscription, the king mirrors the gesture of the winged disk of Ahura Mazda. The image 
of a fire altar further demonstrates the king’s respect for and celebration of the god. King Darius 
stands on a three-step pedestal, and the royal guard surrounds him. The king is seen atop a lion 
bed, like the one seen in the Pharaoh Hatshepsut’s Birth Colonnade at Deir el-Bahri, Egypt. 
Darius’s bed is held up by twenty-eight personifications of the different lands constituting the 
Persian Empire. They raise him up as he participates in a ritual, which may have been a greeting 
recognizing all four corners of the Empire. This image of the load-bearing support of the people 
displays “the power of collective action in the service of a belief system.”22 All Persians play a 
part in upholding the grandeur of kingship and the empire. Further, borrowing imagery from 
Ancient Egypt further seeks to include the Egyptians who are now a part of the Persian Empire.  
Through trilingual inscriptions and imagery appropriated from older and subject cultures, 
the Achaemenid kings sought to create a sense of unified Persian identity. Although these 
specific works are part of a larger landscape, these, in particular, are essential to understanding 
twentieth and twenty-first century Iran, as they will reappear in reimagined ways. 
                                                
22 Root, “Achaemenid Imperial Architecture,” 34. 
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CHAPTER II 
IRAN UNDER REZA KHAN 
 
Reza Khan rose through the military ranks as a commoner. Displeased with the state of 
his country after the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, he instigated a coup d’état in 1921, applying 
military force to convince Ahmad Shah Qajar, the ruler of Persia at that time, to appoint a new 
government. Reza Khan was chosen to be the Minister of War. On October 31, 1925, the 
Parliament voted to oust Ahmad Shah, ending the Qajar dynasty that had ruled Persia since 1785. 
A constituent assembly then voted for Reza Khan to become the next Shah. His coronation took 
place on April 25, 1926, and he changed his name to Reza Shah Pahlavi. 23 After this radical 
change in government, the new Shah sought legitimacy and a redefinition of Persian national 
identity. 
As a part of this redefinition, in 1934, Reza Shah Pahlavi, “wanting to distance his state 
from the decadent, ineffectual Qajar government that he had displaced, instructed his embassies 
overseas to require foreign governments henceforth to call the country Iran in official 
communications.”24 This new name is thought to mean ‘Land of the Aryans.’25 However, this 
change in how to acknowledge and identify the nation conflicted many people. “Some Iranians 
outside Iran still prefer the term Persia because it retains the ancient, often happier, 
connotations.”26  
 
                                                
23 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Answer to History. New York: Stein and Day, 1980. 53. 
24 Axworthy, A History of Iran, xiii. 
25 Reza Zia-Ebrahimi. “Self-Orientalization and Dislocation: The Uses and Abuses of the 
‘Aryan’ Discourse in Iran.” Iranian Studies 44, no. iv (2011): 445-472. 
26 Axworthy, A History of Iran, xiii. 
14 
The Society for National Heritage 
In 1921, following Reza Khan’s coup, the Society for National Heritage (SNH) was 
created; its purpose was to “preserve, protect, and promote Iran’s patrimony.”27 In addition to the 
building of mausoleums for particular Iranian national figures, the SNH worked on over sixty 
preservation projects and created a national museum and public library. Memoirs and Iranian 
publications since that time say that the Society was created under the auspices of Reza Khan, 
who was War Minister at the time. In addition to archaeological projects, the SNH nationalized 
the Persian language, removing foreign words and adding Old Persian words.  
On April 22, 1925, the American art historian Arthur Upham Pope delivered a lecture to 
the Society of National Heritage in Tehran on Iranian art from the Achaemenids to modern 
times.28 Pope’s lecture was in English, but concurrently translated into Persian so that Iranians 
themselves could listen. Pope stressed Iran’s cultural contribution to world civilization, and he 
emphasized that Iranian kings have always served as patrons of the arts. This encouraged Reza 
Khan to further pursue a patronage of art and culture in Iran.  
Also in 1925, the Society created a list of national heritage sites in Iran with the help of 
Ernst Herzfeld, a German archaeologist; it was entitled A Brief Inventory of the Historical 
Heritage and Edifices of Iran. Of the 247 sites on the list, 82 were pre-Islamic.29 This list 
allowed the state to define Iran’s cultural heritage and present that to the Iranian people. The 
sites not selected could, thus, be destroyed, because they did not merit the Society’s preservation. 
At this time, those sites destroyed were largely Qajar, the period directly before Reza Khan took 
                                                
27 Talinn Grigor. “Recultivating ‘Good Taste’: The Early Pahlavi Modernists and Their Society 
for National Heritage.” Iranian Studies 37, no. 1 (2004): 17. 
28 Kishwar Rizvi. “Art History and the Nation: Arthur Urban Pope and the Discourse on “Persian 
Art” in the Early Twentieth Century.” Muqarnas 24 (2007): 47. 
29 P. Avery. Modern Iran (New York, 1965), 287, quoted in Grigor, “Recultivating ‘Good 
Taste,’” 30. 
15 
power. As history shows us, any movement, group, or individual often seeks power by 
discounting the works of those who came directly before them. 
 The SNH also assisted in ending an existing French monopoly on Iran’s archaeological 
sites, which allowed other countries to participate in archaeological research within Iran. This 
allowed for Iran’s prestige and history to be broadcast to a larger and broader audience. In the 
midst of this excitement, an article published in The American Magazine of Art in 1931 stated, 
“It is perfectly possible that Persia may assume, in coming years, the importance of another 
Egypt or Mesopotamia in the archaeological field.”30 In 1931, the University of Chicago’s 
Oriental Institute started official excavations at the Achaemenid Persian palace of Persepolis.31 
These excavations were led by Ernst Herzfeld and financed by the American philanthropist John 
D. Rockefeller. Reza Khan strongly supported the preservation of Persepolis, once commenting, 
“We should build a wall around Persepolis, so we could prevent more damage from happening to 
the site.”32 When two pairs of gold and silver foundation tablets were found beneath the 
Apadana, Reza Shah “ordered that both pairs be kept and brought to the capital.”33 According to 
the 1930 Antiquities Law of Iran, one pair should have been given to the Oriental Institute 
instead of both staying with Iran. However, Reza Shah was intent on keeping and protecting 
Iran’s heritage. 
 The Society for National Heritage also hosted lectures to promote Iran’s heritage. The 
archaeologist Ernst Herzfeld delivered a public lecture at the Ministry of Culture, saying, “If you 
                                                
30Rudolf M. Riefstahl. “Persian Art At Burlington House.” The American Magazine of Art 22, 
no. 6 (1931): 461. 
31 Talinn Grigor. “Preserving the Antique Modern: Persepolis ’71.” Future Anterior: Journal of 
Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism 2, no. 1 (2005): 24. 
32 Quoted in Kaymar Abdi. “Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archaeology in 
Iran.” American Journal of Archaeology 105, no. 1 (2001): 60. 
33 Ali Mousavi. “Persepolis in Retrospect: Histories of Discovery and Archaeological 
Exploration at the Ruins of Ancient Parseh.” Ars Orientalis 32 (2003): 230. 
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refer to world history, you will see that no nation has so much cultural heritage.”34 By comparing 
Iran’s past with the past of other civilizations, Iran appears superior, he argues. This lecture was 
translated into Persian, published, and distributed. According to Education Minister Isa Sadiq, 
this translation was “for the use of teachers all over the country.”35 This allowed Iran to promote 
its immemorial past through public schooling. 
Further, in 1939, the archaeological museum of Iran and adjoining library were 
completed in Tehran. This allowed the state to choose what the people would see and how they 
would see it. Through state-sponsored museums, the state defines the history and cultural 
heritage of the nation. Eric Hobsbawm argues that traditions linking us to an immemorial past 
were often actually invented in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There are three kinds 
of invented traditions: 1) those that establish or symbolize social cohesion of membership in a 
group; 2) those that establish or legitimize institutions, status, or relation to authority; and 3) 
those whose main purpose is socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems, and 
conventions of behavior.36 The activities of the Society fit into the third type of invented tradition 
because it sought, through the national museum and library, to socialize the Iranian people into 
believing that their pre-Islamic history was not only important, but also emblematic of the 
modern nation.  
 The Society for National Heritage was a state-sponsored group tasked with reviving the 
nation’s history, using Iran’s cultural heritage for political propaganda. The Society had the 
power to preserve and restore some structures, while destroying others — those that did not serve 
the Shah’s political agenda. However, these foreign, “secular, modern intelligentsia,” such as 
                                                
34 Grigor, “Recultivating ‘Good Taste,’” 27. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Eric Hobsbawm. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions.” The Invention of Tradition. edited by 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 9. 
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Arthur Upham Pope and Ernst Herzfeld, along with the Shah, were the ones to “create and 
disseminate the historical myths of nationhood,” rather than the masses.37 Even though the 
Shah’s message was effective toward foreigners, his nationalist rhetoric did not have the desired 
effect on his own people. 
1931 International Exhibition of Persian Art 
 In 1931, the Royal Academy of Art in London sponsored the International Exhibition of 
Persian Art. Reza Shah Pahlavi and King George V of the United Kingdom were official patrons 
of the exhibition, while Arthur Upham Pope was the director and organizer. The exhibition 
covered Persian civilization from prehistory to the nineteenth century, with one room focused on 
works from the Achaemenid civilization. The intent of this exhibition was to construct a 
continuous Persian identity, as the viewer moved through the galleries on a chronological tour of 
Persian history and art. Works were gathered from museums and private collections all over the 
world. A relief depicting tribute bearers from the Apadana staircase at Persepolis was on 
display,38 as well as a cast depicting the lion and the bull.39 A 1931 article in The American 
Magazine of Art said: 
The exhibition took place at a most opportune moment, just at the moment when Persia is 
making a new start in her life as an “archaeological country.” This change is due to the 
policy of the new regime which wants to open the country to the life of a modern world 
and which at the same time does not lack understanding for the importance of a great 
artistic and historic past.40 
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With the reign of Reza Shah, the world perceived Iran to be going through a new age. This idea 
of modernity, while maintaining the allure of antiquity, will be reiterated under Mohammad Reza 
Shah.  
Neo-Achaemenid Architecture 
 Throughout the 1930s, public and government buildings in the capital of Tehran were 
designed to resemble the sculptural program at Persepolis and other Achaemenid Persian sites. In 
particular, bull protomes and the image of Ahura Mazda are utilized to represent this era. The 
Zoroastrian Majlis deputy Arbab Keikhosraw, a member of the Iranian Parliament, promoted this 
Neo-Achaemenid style, rather than European styles, in an effort to socialize Iranians to their pre-
Islamic past.41 
 In 1934, the Society for National Heritage built a new mausoleum for the tenth-century 
Persian poet Ferdowsi in Tus, Iran (Fig. 8). Ferdowsi’s major work, the Shahnameh, meaning 
‘Book of Kings,’ describes the heroic age of Achaemenid Persia. Ferdowsi was a nationalist 
figure himself, using poetry to show the people that the nation was ancient and eternal. By 
building a monument to honor him, the Society for National Heritage, and in extension the 
Iranian government, is showing that they support his message. In plan, this mausoleum is 
reminiscent of the tomb of Cyrus the Great, while relief sculptures on the façade are reminiscent 
of the iconography at Persepolis. There are columns topped with bull protomes, like the ones 
seen in the Apadana. An icon of Ahura Mazda is on the central front façade. Today, the Iranian 
passport includes an image of this mausoleum, displaying that the state still values this 
monument as part of its cultural heritage and that the Iranian people would recognize this 
monument as part of their national identity. 
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On February 4, 1934, Reza Shah laid the cornerstone, a gold foundation plate, for the 
Department of Archaeology at Tehran University. He was inspired by the gold and silver plaques 
discovered by the Oriental Institute excavations in 1931 at the foundation of the Apadana at 
Persepolis, which are inscribed with cuneiform inscriptions from King Darius I. 
In 1935, the National Bank of Tehran was completed. The columns are modeled on those 
in the Apadana Hall at Persepolis, with lotus-shaped bases and bull-headed capitals. At the top 
lies the winged image of Ahura Mazda. 
In 1939, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was completed in Tehran (Fig. 9). Crenelations 
line the staircase, similar to those lining the Apadana staircase at Persepolis. Four columns and 
four pilasters with bull protomes hold up the portico and façade. The doorframes resemble the 
gates at Persepolis. Through the architecture of this government building, Iran puts its 
Achaemenid past on display for foreign diplomats. 
Having outlined the activities of the state in the section above, the following section will 
briefly present the public response, both within Iran and internationally. On March 15, 1935, an 
article in Le Journal de Téhéran said: 
“Following its ancestral roots, Iran has once again revived and remains always the nation 
which has demonstrated the ability to assimilate with the certainty of catching-up with 
the lost years. Nothing can prevent a nation to arrive at its goals, and those goals are 
waiting for us.”42 
 
This quote presents three ideas: 1) The nation has always been there, but it is only now ‘revived.’ 
2) The nation of Iran, since the time of the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Achaemenid Empire, 
has been able to promote assimilation and a common culture. 3) The nation has a destiny. All 
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three of these ideas are powerful tools for nationalism, as argued by Etienne Balibar.43 A sense of 
revival and reawakening is a common theme in the rhetoric of both Reza Shah and Mohammad 
Reza Shah.  
 A 1938 article of Time Magazine called Reza Shah the “20th-Century Darius.”44 On the 
cover, the Shah is shown in front of blue faience tiles of a lion striding across the walls of the 
Achaemenid Persian capital of Susa (Fig. 10). Although most Iranians would not have seen this, 
Time is an internationally popular magazine that showcased Reza Shah’s kingship and Persia’s 
antiquity to the world. 
However, soon after, in 1941, the Shah is overthrown by foreign armies and replaced by 
his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah’s son continued his father’s legacy, connecting 
himself and his reign with that of the Achaemenid Persian kings. 
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CHAPTER III 
IRAN UNDER MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLAVI 
 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi received a Western education in Switzerland; this experience 
inspired his admiration for Western culture and modernity. On September 16, 1941, he replaced 
his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was forcibly removed and exiled by the British and Soviet 
Union occupiers of Iran.45 European powers saw neutral Iran as a high-priority for World War II 
due to its oil reserves and its strategic location. The Allied invasion was prompted by Reza 
Shah’s refusal to expel German nationals from Iran. Through naval attacks, armored tank 
divisions, and air raids, Britain and the Soviet Union overran the Iranian military and partitioned 
the country. However, a treaty committed these countries to leaving Iran after the war.46 Due to 
the uncertainty brought on by this foreign occupation, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi needed to 
restore national confidence and identity in Iran.  
Through celebrations and cultural preservation, the Shah intended to create a ‘Great 
Civilization’ that acknowledged Persia’s immemorial past while striving for modernity. This 
“myth of a glorious ethnic past and an equally promising national destiny” is what Smith and 
Balibar argue to be the most effective form of nationalism created by the state. Through 
archaeological excavations and his 1971 celebration of Persian kingship, the Shah reaches “back 
into the past to repurpose history for a new role in the modern age.”47 
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Under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, excavations were resumed at Persepolis and 
Pasargadae. In 1969, Dr. Akbar Tadjvidi, an Iranian archaeologist, and his team of locals began 
work at Persepolis. Tadjvidi’s work was greatly benefited by funds available from the 
government in preparation for the festivities of 1971. Thus, the government approved his 
research proposal on the condition that his work “would not hinder preparation for the grand 
festivities that would highlight the glorious ruins on the Takht.”48  
1971 Celebration at Persepolis 
 In 1971, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi celebrated the 2500-year anniversary of Persian 
kingship, inviting heads of state from all around the world for three days of festivities. The 
festivities began in Pasargadae, one of the five Achaemenid Persian capitals, at the tomb of 
Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire. Iran borrowed the Cyrus Cylinder from 
the British Museum for this celebration.49 To further demonstrate to the world its permanence 
and power, Iran presented the United Nations with a replica of the Cyrus Cylinder.50 The 
Cylinder was also used as an emblem for the Shah’s celebration. Further, the Crown Prince was 
sometimes called Cyrus Reza Pahlavi, after Cyrus the Great. At the beginning of the celebration, 
the Crown Prince and his father marched in front of the tomb of his namesake (Fig. 11). Here, 
the Shah gave a speech, ending it by saying, “Rest in peace, Cyrus, for we are awake, and we 
will always stay awake.”51  
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Next, the Pahlavis and their guests proceeded to Persepolis, another one of the 
Achaemenid Persian capitals. Mohammad Reza Shah insisted that his guests camp outside the 
palace, similar to what the Assyrians, Lydians, Babylonians, etc. would have done during the 
time of the Achaemenid kings, so a great Tent City with all of the modern amenities was erected 
right below the ruins of the ancient palace. Each tent had two bathrooms and a kitchen. They 
were decorated with the finest French crystal, red silk, and chandeliers. That evening, there was 
an extravagant dinner and a modern sound and light spectacle. On the morning of the final day, 
over six thousand men paraded in front of the ruins in a display depicting Persian history, from 
the Achaemenids to the modern Pahlavi state.52 
Through this celebration, the Shah optimistically highlights Persia’s antiquity as a tool to 
bring the Iranian people together. The celebration defined the origin of the Iranian nation with 
the Shah’s acknowledgement of Cyrus the Great as the founder of the Persian Empire. “The 
formation of the nation thus appears as the fulfillment of a ‘project’ stretching over centuries, in 
which there are different stages and moments of coming to self-awareness.”53 His celebration 
presented the myth that the nation had always been there, but the Iranian people were now 
“awake” to realize it. Gellner acknowledges this nationalist rhetoric, but calls it “misguided;” he 
argues that nationalism is not the awakening, but it is indeed how it presents itself.54  
The celebration was a form of invented tradition promoted by the government of Iran. 
With Eric Hobsbawm’s three kinds of invented traditions in mind, 55 the 1971 celebration fulfills 
the second kind because it sought to legitimize the status of the Shah, and the institution of 
                                                
52 Talinn Grigor. “Orientalism & Mimicry of Selfness: Archaeology of the Neo-Achaemenid 
Style.” Orientalisme architectural entre imaginaires et savoirs. (Paris: Picard, 2005), 7. 
53 Balibar, “The Nation Form,” 96. 
54 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 46. 
55 Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” 9. 
24 
Persian kingship, in the eyes of both world leaders and the Iranian people. By arguing that 
Persian kings had ruled this land for 2500 years, the Shah reiterates the rhetoric of “the perpetual 
seed of kingship” that Cyrus had presented in the sixth century BCE.56 However, as Hobsbawm 
tells us, the historic right and continuity of rule lost power as a guarantor of loyalty.57  
 This celebration was an act of political theater; Persepolis was the stage, “an ostensibly 
authentic site of national origin,” on which to perform the invented tradition.58 The Shah sought 
to convince Iranians and foreigners of the epic grandeur of the nation. Particularly with the 
parade of Persian history, “the Shah was remodeling history to his own political and personal 
ends, presenting it as a kind of Hollywood epic.”59 Furthering this idea, the Persian soldiers in 
the parade wore period clothing and were told not to shave in order to make it more ‘realistic;’ 
this historical reconstruction set the tone of the nationalist message. Each group in the parade 
acted as pictorial tableaux, representing each period of Persia’s history. This parade occurred in 
front of Persepolis, which was meant to act as the ethnoscape for the celebration. However, some 
Iranians felt that the soldiers and monument did not actually resemble their idea of the nation.  
Although some were able to watch the parade of Persian history on television, most 
Iranian people were excluded from this celebration. If we follow Anthony Smith’s argument, this 
exclusion is why the Shah’s nationalist agenda failed to convince his people of an Iranian 
identity stemming from antiquity. “All the country’s money went into ridiculous celebrations of 
the 2500 years of dynasty and other frivolities…All of this to impress heads of state; the 
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population couldn’t have cared less.”60 Instead, the celebration was primarily an act of theater for 
the world. The Shah invited other world leaders to this celebration, because a sovereign nation 
requires recognition and legitimization from other nations. These visiting world leaders “paid 
tribute to Cyrus and his Kingdom” like the tribute barriers portrayed on the Apadana staircase at 
Persepolis (Fig. 5).61 The Shah, in particular, wanted the Western, First World to acknowledge 
Iran as an historic, yet modern nation-state.  
 The modern amenities of the Tent City and the light show at Persepolis were an attempt 
to portray Iran’s modernity. The Shah’s modernization sought to convince the Iranian people of a 
“promising national destiny,” while also acknowledging its past.62 For his foreign guests, the 
Shah staged the ruins so that they provided the guests with “a modern look without impairing 
their antique allure.”63 At the time, the Shah even replaced the Islamic calendar with the ancient 
Persian one. The year was reset to 2535, so that now Europe (1976) would look forward to Iran 
(2535).64 Similar to how the Western world defines its history by using the death of Christ as its 
year zero, the Shah attempted to socialize Iranians to the idea that their national memory began 
with the creation of the Persian monarchy under Cyrus the Great. This gave the perception that 
the nation was both eternal and natural, when it was actually a government-sponsored invention.  
 Stamps and banknotes were also used as propaganda to glorify twenty-five centuries of 
Iranian achievement, depicting the Shah next to the Apadana Hall or the tomb of Cyrus the 
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Great.65 These were important tools for the socialization of Iranians to the idea of a collective 
past, as stamps and banknotes are both items that regular Iranians would often use. 
Over the course of the Shah’s reign, there were multiple attempts on his life, and he was 
involved in two dangerous airplane crashes; he survived each event, so, he argues, God must 
have saved his life. As Marjane Satrapi remembers in her memoir Persepolis, the first page of 
her schoolbook said that the Shah was chosen by God.66 Through this rhetoric, he intended to 
legitimize his divine right to rule, as Achaemenid kings had claimed before him. However, as 
Eric Hobsbawm argues, this divine ordination could no longer guarantee civic loyalty. 67 
Road to Revolution 
The Pahlavi Shahs’ funding of archaeological research and conservation projects and the 
1971 celebration at Pasargadae and Persepolis intended to create a collective memory that 
supported Iran’s longevity and continuity. However, the Shahs’ political propaganda was 
ultimately unsuccessful in creating a ‘Great Civilization’ — the imagined national community.68 
The Shahs attempted to make modernization and nationalism a top-down affair, when, in reality, 
it needed the support of the Iranian people. Alam Saleh and James Worrall argue, “A top down 
approach to the construction of nationalism was always likely to make more enemies than the 
fostering and promotion of bottom-up conceptions of identity.”69 As Anthony Smith claims, 
these historical myths and symbols needed to be “easily accessible to the mass of the ‘national’ 
membership,” rather than instigated by a secular, modern intelligentsia that was often comprised 
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of foreigners, such as Arthur Upham Pope.70 It seemed as if foreigners, along with the Iranian 
monarchy, were trying to force Iranian national identity upon the people. This was particularly 
ineffective due to the distaste for foreigners following the European occupation of Iran at the 
beginning of Mohammad Reza’s reign and additional foreign intervention during the Mossadegh 
era.71  
There was also backlash saying that Iran needed to focus on its Islamic roots, rather than 
its pre-Islamic, Achaemenid roots. “[T]he Achaemenids meant little to most Iranians,” and few 
had visited Persepolis or heard about the archaeological discoveries.72 The Pahlavi government 
misunderstood what the people believed to be the collective narrative of the nation. Many 
scholars argue that the Shah’s secular nationalism and failure to include the people provoked the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IRAN SINCE THE REVOLUTION 
 
 In 1979, as revolutionaries tore down the statue of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 
front of his palace in Tehran, a new nation was born – The Islamic Republic of Iran (Fig. 12). An 
Iranian propaganda poster shows a statue of the deposed Shah having stood atop a pedestal with 
imagery from Persepolis; this furthers the idea that the Shah’s reign and power stood atop a 
pedestal, or stage, of antiquity. Other posters show the columns of Persepolis crumbling behind 
the fallen Shah. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that overthrew the government of 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and founded the Islamic Republic of Iran, the nation was in need 
of a new national identity that broke away from the secular, Achaemenid identity that the Shahs 
had defined for the nation. In general, Iran after the revolution has focused on the Islamic history 
of Iran rather than the pre-Islamic, Achaemenid past. However, the Islamic government’s 
growing re-appreciation for its pre-Islamic past can be seen through museum exhibitions, 
archaeological expeditions, and government rhetoric toward ancient sites. 
After the revolution, there were calls from some to not only flatten the Tent City of 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, but to also flatten Persepolis, which had now been poisoned 
with monarchist undertones due to the Shah’s 1971 celebration. This destruction was prevented, 
but other sites were not as lucky. In February 1979, Reza Shah’s mausoleum in Tehran was 
destroyed by revolutionaries, and the place was later transformed into a public restroom.  
Instead of being destroyed, some sites were repurposed under the new nationalist agenda. 
For example, the Shahyad Tower that was commissioned by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 
1971 in order to celebrate 2500 years of Persian kingship was renamed after the revolution to 
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Azadi Tower, meaning “Freedom Tower” (Fig. 13). This modern, monarchical monument was 
repurposed for the use of the Islamic Revolution, such as for rallies. Today, Iranian leaders are 
often seen giving important speeches in front of this monument. 
After the revolution, Mohammad Reza Shah lived in exile in a variety of locations: 
Mexico, America, Panama, and Egypt. In looking at his nation after the revolution, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi bemoans “this obliteration of our national identity and the cultural and spiritual 
heritage of Iran.”73 In his memoir entitled Answer to History, he retells the history of his “very 
old country,” starting with the Achaemenid Dynasty, discussing how this empire was the 
paradigm for future empires around the world.74 
However, Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the revolution and imagined 
Iran as a state founded on Islamic principles, “saw national affiliations as a product of Western 
thought, which was inimical to, and used as an instrument to undermine, the ‘unity of Islam.’”75 
Nationalism was rejected and suppressed, as it was believed to detach the individual from the 
rest of the Muslim world. Archaeology and pre-Islamic history were considered “symbols of 
monarchical tyranny” instead of visual representations of a common Iranian identity and 
history.76 The new regime declared that children given ancient Persian names, such as Cyrus and 
Darius, would not be issued birth certificates.77 Textbooks were rewritten in order to 
“demonarchize” the curriculum, particularly those for history, sociology, religious studies, and 
art.78 The Pahlavi regime is demonized in these new textbooks, and the West is accused of 
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“attacking the cultural heritage of once proud nations by taking away their identity and replacing 
it with pale carbon copies of the Western personality.”79 Instead of portraying the origin of the 
nation at the reign of Cyrus the Great, textbooks from the Islamic Republic of Iran define the 
national origin at the rise of the Prophet Mohammad. The pre-Islamic period is only mentioned 
to describe the “tyranny” and “depravity” which allegedly existed before Islam.80 The post-
revolution government understood that primary and secondary schooling, as Etienne Balibar 
argued, has the ability to socialize the next generation to a new national identity.81 
Turning a New Leaf 
When Iranian President Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) visited Persepolis on 
April 20, 1991, he wrote in the guest book, “Visiting the incredible remains at Persepolis 
provokes considerable national pride in every individual.”82 He was the first Iranian leader since 
the 1979 Revolution to visit this ancient site. This “national pride” would be felt if Persepolis 
were recognized as part of Iran’s history and identity. His statement opened the door to further 
national appreciation and international cooperation regarding Iran’s pre-Islamic past. 
In 1995, joint archaeological expeditions began again in Iran, such as one with the 
Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, which had originally begun work in Iran in 1931 
under Raza Shah Pahlavi. In the 1990s, Iran also sponsored two symposia, a lecture series, and a 
periodical on archaeological research. 83 
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After Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) visited Persepolis in 2001, “he 
called for its restoration and instigated its return to official national narratives.”84 Khatami 
initiated numerous, more tolerant cultural policies with the financial support of the state. This 
included art exhibitions, publications, and programming. 
In August 2003, the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization (ICHO), which was formed in 
1985, hosted an international conference on ancient cultural relations between Iran and the West. 
Foreign archaeologists were flown in, courted, and taken on a tour of historic sites, such as 
Persepolis. Masoud Azarnash, director of ICHO’s Archaeological Research Center in Tehran 
said, “We had the impression that archaeologists served to enhance certain ideological aspects of 
the regime before the revolution.”85 This was seen in the 1920s with Arthur Upham Pope and the 
Society of National Heritage. Although there is a lingering distrust stemming from the period of 
the Pahlavi Shahs, Iranian archaeologists are now more willing to work with foreigners, as this 
international conference demonstrates.  
In April 2004, the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago returned three hundred 
cuneiform tablets to Iran; these tablets were discovered at Persepolis in 1933 during an 
expedition led by the Oriental Institute. Gill Stein, Director of the Institute, sees “returning these 
tablets as part of a partnership.”86 
Also in 2004, Pasargadae, the Achaemenid Persian capital founded by Cyrus the Great, 
was added to the UNESCO World Heritage List. The site is owned by the government and is 
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managed by the government-funded Iranian Cultural Heritage, Tourism and Handicraft 
Organization (ICHHTO).87 
In 2008, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said, “Iran’s advancements after Islam 
are incomparable to its past. However, pre-Islamic history of Iran is also part of our history.”88 
This acknowledgement of Iran’s antiquity is much warmer than the rhetoric of the former 
Supreme Leader and leader of the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini. 
Cyrus Cylinder Exhibition 
In 2010, the British Museum, at the request of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
(2005-2013), loaned the Cyrus Cylinder to Iran (Fig. 1).89 However, this exhibition caused 
backlash in the Western media, who argued that the Cyrus Cylinder, a symbol of human rights 
for its representation of religious freedom to the conquered Babylonians, did not belong in Iran, a 
country that has allegedly violated human rights. A UN special reporter on human rights in Iran 
said that the Cylinder should “serve as a reminder to the Government that Iranians will continue 
to demand, and must be granted, their most basic human rights by their political leaders.”90 The 
exhibition gained so much attention and popularity among the Iranian people that it was 
extended for three months. Thus, from Darius to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to President 
Ahmadinejad, a connection to Cyrus has been a powerful tool of legitimacy. However, in the 
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eyes of some, “[Ahmadinejad] stands accused of advocating Iranian nationalism” due to his 
lauding of former Persian kings, particularly Cyrus.91 
After the exhibition’s success in Iran, the Cyrus Cylinder, along with sixteen other 
Achaemenid Persian artworks, was shown in the United States on a traveling exhibition 
sponsored by the British Museum.92 Neil MacGregor, Director of the British Museum, said that 
the proclamation on the Cyrus Cylinder was “the first attempt we know about running a society, 
a state with different nationalities and faiths — a new kind of statecraft.”93 Although this 
traveling exhibition was not sponsored by the Iranian government, it was financed by members 
of the Iranian diaspora and by the Iran Heritage Foundation, a charity in the United Kingdom.  
In looking at other museum partnerships, on January 28, 2016, the Iranian Cultural 
Heritage, Tourism and Handicraft Organization (ICHHTO), which is overseen by the Vice-
President of Iran, and the Louvre in Paris signed a deal to renew cultural and scientific 
cooperation, including plans for exchanges of exhibitions, publications, and archaeological digs. 
A French team may even be able to return to research the Achaemenid capital of Susa, where 
they had previously discovered the Code of Hammurabi.94 
Protests at the Tomb of Cyrus the Great 
 On October 28, 2016, hundreds of “nationalist protestors” demonstrated in front of the 
tomb of Cyrus – the same tomb where Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi held the first day of his 
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92 The British Museum. “The Cyrus Cylinder travels to the US,” 2012. 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2012/cyrus_cylinder_tr
avels_to_us.aspx. 
93 Slavin, “‘Cyrus Cylinder’ Reminder of Persian Legacy of Tolerance.” 
94 Vincent Noce. “Louvre inks historic deal with Iran to cooperate on archaeological digs, 
exhibitions and exchanges.” The Art Newspaper. January 31, 2016. Accessed December 29, 
2016. http://theartnewspaper.com/news/museums/louvre-inks-historic-deal-with-iran-to-
cooperate-on-archaeological-digs-exhibitions-and-exchanges/. 
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festivities in 1971. This day, October 28, marks the day Cyrus conquered Babylon in 539 BCE. 95 
Protestors shouted slogans praising the Achaemenid king. Senior Iranian clerics condemned 
these acts as sacrilegious, and the protestors were arrested by the state.96 If Cyrus is a symbol of 
the freedom of religion, then he does not represent the freedom of assembly or of speech.  
These monuments from antiquity “were perceived as public signs that celebrated an 
unwanted monarch, only later to become sites of resistance to an equally unwanted theocracy.”97 
Throughout time, Cyrus has been a symbol of freedom and benevolence. During and after the 
reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, his tomb became an emblem of secular monarchy, and 
was, thus, hated by the Islamic government. Now, the tomb has become a nationalist icon, 
imbued with the hope of returning to both the immemorial past of the Achaemenids and the 
‘Great Civilization’ of the Pahlavis.  
On the same day as these protests, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani published a picture 
on Instagram of himself at Persepolis,98 saying, “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique 
remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, 
the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their 
monotheism” (Fig. 14).99 President Rouhani acknowledges the antiquity of Iran, as well as 
promoting its history of monotheism, from Zoroastrianism to Islam. Government leaders are 
utilizing new tools, such as social media, to administer their nationalist rhetoric to the people. 
                                                
95 The ‘Day of Cyrus’ is actually October 30, but they had to move it due to the overlap of leap 
years in the Iranian and Gregorian calendars. 
96 Saied Jafari. “‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics.” Al-Monitor. November 2, 2016. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/iran-cyrus-day-commemoration-nouri-
hamedani-protest.html 
97 Talinn Grigor. Building Iran: modernism, architecture, and national heritage under the 
Pahlavi monarchs. (Berkshire: Periscope Publishing, 2009), 203.  
98 Hassan Rouhani. Instagram post. October 28, 2016. 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BMHWM6SBRlx/?taken-by=hrouhani&hl=en 
99 Jafari, “‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics.” 
35 
 Every Iranian president since Rafsanjani in 1991 has interacted with Iran’s Achaemenid 
past, touting its importance to Iran’s collective memory. From sites imbued with monarchical 
overtones to sites of national protest, Achaemenid Persia has been essential to the understanding 
of Iranian identity. Through international cooperation on archaeological research and museum 
exhibitions that showcase Iran’s Achaemenid past to its people and to the world, Iran is 
promoting its antiquity as a part of its national identity.  
36 
CONCLUSION 
 
Persia has always been a multi-ethnic land with a need to socialize its people behind a 
common identity and collective memory. Although other periods of Persian art, language, and 
other aspects of culture have been utilized for Iran’s nationalist agenda, the art and architecture 
of antiquity are essential in the construction of a collective narrative for the nation. The rhetoric 
of the Shahs attempted to prove that the Iranian nation is a natural, pre-destined entity that began 
with the rule of Cyrus the Great. However, this rhetoric was ultimately unsuccessful, as the 1979 
Revolution shows, because the Shahs failed to create an inclusionary message. They were 
focused on promoting Iran’s antiquity to Europeans, through exhibitions, lectures, and 
archaeological projects, as well as political theater. Since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian 
government has warmed to its pre-Islamic past, as presidential rhetoric has shown since 1991. 
The history of Achaemenid Persia has been, and continues to be, a part of the story of the Iranian 
nation, as defined by the government. 
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Figure 13. Rally of the Fedayin Khalg in front of the Azadi (freedom) monument, formerly the 
Aryamehr (light of the Aryan), 1980. [Photo courtesy of Magnum Photos] 
 
 
54 
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